global influence during the economic security and review commission. our first panel today will examine why and how china's developing expeditionary capabilities with a focus on the built and road in initiative. as a va testing capabilities. we'll start with admiral dennis blair, chairman of the board and distinguished senior fellow at sestak ottawa peace foundation. admiral blair, serves as a

member of the energy security leadership council and the board of the freedom house, national bureau of asian research, and the atlantic council. previously served as director of national intelligence from january oh nine to may of 2010. and prior to retiring from the navy, in 2002 after 34 years, he was commander of u.s. pacific command. admiral blair will provide testimony on the drivers of china's development. >> when the senate gavels and monday at 3:00 p.m. point asia llc, a consultancy that provides expertise on the indo pacific region with a focus on chinese foreign policy and security issues. she also holds a position of abject senior policy analyst at rand, formally she served as director of the navy asia-pacific advisory group at the pentagon. and was a senior project

director for chinese military and security, she has written extensively on chinese foreign policy security and military affairs. she will address how bri furthers their expeditionary capabilities as well. thank you for your testimony, we will begin. good morning commissioners, thanks for inviting me here. i think it would probably be most valuable if i cut to the chase here. i think what you are concerned about is whether china, which can assert the full range of power projection affects on its maritime frontiers, south china sea, east china sea, yellow sea. whether it can or will expand that capability elsewhere in the world and be able to bring

the military dimension of coercive diplomacy to join economic and diplomatic activities, which is currently conducts. i think it's useful to start by reminding ourselves of what power projection is. we're all -- identifying power projection as asserting political influence at distance through the use or the threat of use military force. that is what we are talking about here. and so power projection has a range of levels. from a single ship visiting a port. now ship visiting a port in a country is a little bit different than the beijing symphony orchestra visiting that country. it has an implied edge of hay, we can show up with military force and small numbers-y, we

can visit ship and give nice speeches. there is a stiletto under the glove. all the way up through high and combinations of amphibious assault, air assault, global powers, very control to do it. now china has a full range of power capabilities on their maritime frontiers. they have a plan and a capability for a full invasion of taiwan. they routinely use coercive diplomacy throughout the region. and can they and will they bring that out? i think it's useful to think in terms of two zones in addition to their maritime frontiers-y. i think china thinks in these terms. one is the area from let's say the middle east through southeast asia. the south asia.

and then there's the rest of the world beyond that. there's maritime frontiers, south asia area and the rest of the world. but do they have the ambitions or capability to expand this capability out there? so let's talk about the area of south asia since it is an area of chinese focus. she's doing things signature policy program, the built-in road initiative is centered on that region. they aim to make china the transportation hub for all economic activity going through that area and therefore, have a tremendous amount of economic influence and build more influence on top of that. what about the military influence within that? which has been relatively restrained to this point, shanghai cooperative organization. that brings in a lot of those countries were familiar with.

familiar with the anti piracy patrols that they've had some. what comes next? i think we do have to take seriously what the chinese say. you read their documents, the power projection appears nowhere in those documents. they're not talking about it. i don't think there's some secret program that they are not talking about. i think they are not counting on it right now. the history of chinese overseas missions has been that missions expand with expanding capability. so something that was not possible or talked about before it becomes possible, talked about, capabilities grow. we've seen that and in chinese areas. i don't think the lack of it being addressed is particularly significant. what about the real

capabilities that are involved in power projection? right now, for china to get forces into the indian ocean, into south asia, they have to pass, and to do that through international waters or airspace where they don't need anybody's permission, they have to go through the strait of singapore, straight malaysia, pretty narrow entries, both of them subject to interruption. what they really need to be able to have a deplorable, usable, high-end projection capability in that part of the world are a couple of bases. think of united states basis and you costa rica. the ones we used to have in the philippines. you're talking about ship repair, airstrip, ammunitions storage, supplies storage, a serious maritime projection base. the two candidates for that i would say the grow out of the

built and road initiative are the ends of the china myanmar economic corridor which ends in the myanmar court of -- i can never remember the name. doug and then the china but, pakistan economic corridor detail which ends at the mouth of the entrance to the persian golf. if china could establish bases on those, in those two key ports, with secure supply lines running from china, they would have the basis for a serious projection capability in that part of the world. but, there's some very major practical problems in achieving that. primarily, the attitudes of both myanmar and pakistan with which hitler four have shown no desire to have chinese troops stationed in their country. in fact, they've been very careful about it.

even if they did want to, when you look at those actual roots, both roomy and more and pakistan, they go through ungoverned areas and which the governments of myanmar and pakistan don't really run the show right now. and those lines of communication to key bases would be very much subject to interruption. the united states has a fair amount of experience in trying to put military installations into difficult parts of the world and it has not been a happy experience. so, i think there's some practical difficulties there. oh gosh amount of time i think. what what i do about it? which is more important, i will make this very quick. i think the united states needs to concentrate its efforts in east asia where the challenge is direct. we have allies that china is

trying to undercut our support to. china is trying to undercut american use of american use of air and space in that part of the world. we need to keep building up the number and capabilities of our forces there in order to enforce our rights and that's mostly air and naval power and keeping our alliances in good shape. that will not only protect strong interest we have it what is the economic center of the world. but in addition. it will tend to focus chinese attention on that part of the world. and tend to dampen their appetite capability, an interest, going forward. let me stop there. and we can go further in questions. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you members of the commission and staff it is it pleasure to testify on china's

expeditionary capabilities. our focus on the built-in road, security frameworks that china is using to justify the development and use of expeditionary capabilities. as well as how they experience overseas deployments is driving the development. so be on the motivations discussed in the previous panel and by admiral blair, china justifies the development of capabilities in three ways. first, beijing works to align security interests of bri countries through the creation of security dialogue and frameworks for security cooperation. which provide a foundation for future military cooperation and potentially expanded presence. examples include china's efforts to protect bri projects through corp. -- through the organization which is focused on counterterrorism and the protection of oil and gas pipelines. the quadrennial mechanism

includes pakistan, afghanistan and china and provides a form for military and security cooperation between those members. so those are just a few examples of the type of security cooperation frameworks china is developing. second in 2015 china adopted a counterterrorism law that provides legal justification for the pla's to deploy overseas for counterterrorism missions. it is not say they need to receive permission from the host country. the language and law is kind of vague. counterterrorism missions can theoretically -- to be a threat to citizens, bri info structure or overseas port facilities and shipping lanes. so given this could hypothetically deploy overseas under the counterterrorism law to address many of these contingencies. china cultivates the narrative that expeditionary capability

will lead to international security. it is a narrative they used to justify overseas operations such as the u.n. peacekeeping mission, the piracy operations in the opening of the djibouti naval base which chinese commentary stated was good for regional stability and that allows china to contribute to international obligations. so these are three ways china uses legal tools, secured frameworks and narratives to justify the acquisition and use of expeditionary capabilities. i was asked to comment on pla overseas appointment and how pla uses these as training opportunities for expeditionary missions. these counter efforts to provide and the chinese talk about it in their literature. while the training is likely insufficient for the larger

scale expeditionary operations. it does offer the pla benefits. first through u.n. peacekeeping missions, they gain experience operating in a multinational force. other -- they do not have a great experience working with her commanding multinational forces. encountering piracy has begin to iron out logistics for the deploying taskforces. these areas would still be challenges for sure for the pla and larger overseas operations. finally perhaps the greatest gannett -- the greatest benefit as they help to normalize china's military presence abroad. they contribute to china's influence through building security cooperation and military ties with local forces and host country governments and support the narrative a pla is a stronger expedition or

capacity is better for security. the pla's current overseas mission a relatively limited in scope and do not offer the kind of training the military would likely need from a complex tradition or operations. only small resent of troops and commanders have these missions. many of their expeditionary gas capabilities will be tested for the first time in a crisis. in conclusion, china will use its defense of global security interests along with security cooperation agreements to justify the development and use of its expeditionary capabilities. approach is we should be prepared for a china that will consider the use of its overseas military power as a foreign policy tool and it doesn't need a great deal of military power to use it a foreign policy tool influencing. this is already happening.

setting to africa and central asia and south asia augment china's economic and political influence in the regions and its relations with countries were china interests are growing. this also carries some risk for china is increased use of the military overseas may backfire and alienate some countries. following on this point, one recommendation is to look for opportunities to shape china's use overseas. this can include rallying u.s. allied -- allies partnered when it's in the u.s. interest to resolve security issues or it might include using a lack of involvement to attempt to tip them in using nonmilitary this will likely require increasing dialogue and appealing overseas, defense and double medic attack chaise. i think i will stop there. thank you.

>> commissioner campos. >> federal blair thank you so much for being here today but. thank you for your testimony. admiral have two questions for you first i appreciate you taxonomy on the types. of power projections, how we ought to think of this term which has very broad applications. you've added a great deal of clarity to this issue. in a way, your first three types of examples of power projection activity are already underway. china has already conducted them. in many ways, is a comparable to the points that they're making earlier to the teachers that he stay competition. i wanted to focus my question on the fourth area of power projection. you say at the highest end up our projection capabilities. the capability united states has developed during world war

ii and use during the 75 years since. china is nowhere near developing the scale of power projection capability. and you say a couple of reasons. in your mind. you put yourself back to when your commander in chief of the u.s. pacific a man. what would be the specific kinds of capabilities that would grab your attention to suggest that the pla was more interested in conducting this category four level of power projection? >> >> i would not have anything terribly original there. a buildup of amphibious capabilities, lha's that they've just built. major exercises within china within airborne assault forces

and and a tremendous thickening of the logistic support. which is where you have to carry most of it there. and then on the political side i would have to -- the united states really uses we do a big scale overseas interventions we have an ally we can flow into and then go into and if china's relationships with pakistan or myanmar or one of the countries they deal with begin to take that turn, than i would become concerned. those the ones i would look for. >> the second area is you talk

about the zones and the chinese interest in rejecting power in the zone. and our role should be lj

who conducts? it how does it filter up. what are the perceptions of rank and file out in the field in terms of how welcome they are versus? the party sense of their role and impact is in beijing? >> >> i could probably talk for one hour on that but i won't. >> good. you have five minutes. a lot of that analysis comes from the chinese president. you can see in his speeches, the motivation behind the next edition erie pla. the chinese power dream, the strong military, the are i, really links china's economic

and security issues in a way the new historic missions of the pla and broadening it out into the next step. beyond official speeches, there's plenty of analysis on the bureau from think tanks to talk about the security issues. there has definitely been a stove pipe-ing of information going up to the president in recent years. so i can't answer exactly how much of that filters up to him, but a lot of the motivations are discussed by him in official speeches and also in the defense white papers and the things that they publish. in terms of party influence in the field which i think was your second question, they have an issue with commanding control overseas. they've managed to work it out but those are limited missions. they're appealing reform effort, they have new theater commands,

even gaps within regional contingencies over who would command different operations and theater command. if there is an issue in india for example, the western theater command might send brown troops to the border but if they needed naval assets, the western theater command does not have those, so they would need to coordinate with a different theater command. if you take that on a global, expeditionary mission, who is commanding what? the pla marine corps has a headquarters that is not subordinate to any of the theater command navy headquarters. so it is independent, which is probably good so they can far out the troops when they need to support different missions. they don't have a joint force mechanism to coordinate these issues yet. i think that's something they would have to develop if they truly wanted an expeditionary capability in the future. >> >> i just want to clarify, when you talk about analysis in your statement and your comments, the analysis is entirely contained in beijing in terms of what -- in terms of

the successes of their operations abroad and the impact. >> i mean yes. xi has directed the pla to do these things go to build an expedition capability and ability of protecting their -- when i talked about the new historic missions that was about protecting china's interest at the time. but now it's about more than that. it's about becoming a great power. being able to shake the international security -- shape the international security environment. so yes, these are things, i mean, i don't know what analysis he is getting to come up with those things but they are things he is saying. >> i am interested in analysis in terms of the calculation of risk and if there is a dearth of solid evidence what is the likeliness of miscalculation? in your testimony you talk about the public as they participate in bri investments

or are deployed, you characterize the citizens of china as expecting that the government will protect. whether it is military, economic, or human assets. i am curious about the basis for that assertion, that there is a public expectation of protection of chinese assets abroad. >> there have been several polls in chinese newspapers over the years asking the public if they would support more oversees pla presence and the polls have been supportive of that. second, there's been a number of studies done recently on the public view of use of military as a foreign policy tool. what these studies have found and one of them is not a chinese study, but the two others are is, that the public does support increasing use of the military. it's more hawkish in nature to shape foreign policy.

they are not opposed to it, let's put it that way. that's part of it. but i would say it's also that when incidents have occurred, the public -- i do want to go so far to say there's been unrest that there's been some discontent. you can see it online, a lot of the netizens came online after the hostagetaking in mali where three chinese citizens were killed. i think about the same time there's also an issue in the philippines that involved the death of several chinese citizens. this actually forced xi jinping to come on television, chinese television and say we're going to develop, the means to protect them -- to better protect citizens abroad. >> admiral blair, did you have a comment? >> i was just reminded of something, one indicator of what china is up to would be the establishment of a regional combatant command strategy

outside of china. right now the united states is the only country that feels obliged to divide the entire world up into geographic districts and put a 4-star officer in charge of each one. if you were to see that in chinese, their current structure is strictly internal, that would be i would say a major indicator that ambitions are afoot. >> thank you. commissioner lewis? thank you very much for your presentations today. you probably have more experience in china than many of us have ever had in our lives. even though we've all been there. i have two questions. number one is, chinese companies control about 90 ports throughout the world including both ends of the panama canal, how concerned are you that these could become staging grounds for

expeditionary forces in a military sense. secondly, what is your view as to why china has not moved on taiwan and what can we do to deter them from ever moving on time one? if you go into these places and look into the costco owned or other owned places. you can certainly look down into them, there somewhere houses and space. if the country in which these are located decided they wanted to take control, that bad things were going on, they could walk right in with minor police forces and take them over. these are not bases. good listening posts, good information to be gathered, good economic levers that you can use right up to the point of using them. but if you look at sri lanka,

panama canal and so on, i do not see these as but serious potential military bases. and the question of taiwan. the reason china hasn't taken action today. number one they have not really built, if you look carefully at the forces they built and the way they've exercised them they seem more designed to keep taiwan from becoming independent than they do taking and holding the place by force. you know, i think they're good sense of strategy just. son sue said it's best not to break here and me into little pieces, but keep in hope because you can do a better job of controlling him once it's all over. the mayhem that would be involved in a real invasion of taiwan would be unpredictable.

you'd be hard to put it back together. i think the chinese his preferred capability is to use the military force to keep taiwan from achieving independence. keep its mind focused on chinese objectives and then reach some sort of an accommodation that is liberated economic, people to people, diplomatic things. that be the solution to reuniting their country. not to say it could not change, but i think it's the way they think about it now. >> what do you think we should be doing about deterring them from taking military action? >> more of what we are doing now. i agree with the administration that we need to keep the quantity and the quality of our forces in east asia. bear and those that are there, increase at a faster pace in order to offset china. i mean, when i was there i would always think of the final briefing when the generals and

admirals had to go into central military committee and say okay, here's our plan for taking over taiwan, and we are ready to go. and you want that plan to have a high level of risk. you want the chinese not to know what we might do. you want them to be afraid of the capabilities they don't know about that we could bring to bear. you want them to be worried about the secondary and tertiary effects of maybe success in the near term but not able to reinforce. maybe they enable a formation of an east asian nato in which all of the other countries actually joined with the united states to form a strong military alliance against future moves. you want all of those doubts to be really high so that china will continue to prefer a peaceful way to reach their goals, and we prefer that to go on for a very long time. >> how do you assess the philippine reaction to the u.s. relation with the philippines? >> which aspect of the philippines?

renouncing the vfa? >> he does not reflect most informed philippine national security either officials who can't talk or those experienced in it who do talk to us informally. most filipinos who think seriously about the country think that the alliance with the united states is their best bet for security over the long term. so we operated before we had the vfa. it was cumbersome. we had to negotiate the conditions of each individual exercise that we were running. we could go back to that again. in my mind it keeps, it throws grit into the gears of serious military cooperation with the philippines that it does not -- but it does not eliminate it. >> do you have anything to add to that?

>> just on the port issue. it is not a matter of great concern but i think in the future we will see more logistics hubs colocated with commercial ports. i do think they're entering into these commercial agreements with the intention of expanding it at least, especially in countries where they have large bri funding, like pakistan and some other places like that where you would end up with a logistics hub co-located with a commercial port that they could use to then augment their expeditionary missions. >> commissioner? thank you very much both of you. you're really thoughtful testimony. i have a question for each of you. i will start with mrs. goodness. peacekeeping aside, do pla

forces, when they are deployed either for disaster relief or golf aiding operations, working coalition with other forces? >> >> no. >> not usually. so i think, i think i'm not sure about this but it think the gulf of aden operations have. that sometimes worked in coalition certainly escorted foreign ships. but it's not in the same way as like the peacekeeping mission in mali. >> admiral blair, you intrigue me because you essentially painted a competitive strategy by keeping u.s. forces in the asia-pacific strong, active and able. it focuses chinese attention in that near zone. we are going to hear testimony

later today that says they could already send an amphibious ready group of about 2000 marines with helicopters out with a small surface warfare group out certainly as far perhaps as the indian ocean. if they -- they are building more amphibious vehicles and service vehicles. if they began regular presence operations in places that challenge us, could that turn that competitive strategy around? testimony later today that says -- competitive strategy around? would we have to turn to other commands to handle that? >> there is a sense of scale. 2000 marines versus a 150,000 person force to invade taiwan. it is just in the hierarchy,

the -- maslow's hierarchy of chinese concerns the further you get, the less is a concern if they are worried about their ability to achieve their goals in the first and second island chain that will get priority. they are feeling better about being able to do that, and not as forcibly -- that because we are not reacting as strongly and as forcibly as we could. were we to up our game there, and i think our relations with japan would allow that the -- would allow that in a way it wouldn't when i was in command. our relations with taiwan itself would change that, vietnam, so that we could have

more of a northern extension also, the group of countries that are worried about china. all of those would refocus chinese attention on the near term. the other is technology. although you can count ships and submarines, in the new areas of warfare cyberspace, revived electronic warfare there are capabilities the united states is closer to which could make a huge difference which would worry china a great deal. that all of their investment in platforms and missiles and submarines could be undercut. the more we do of that the better. keep them focused and pouring military resources into that which are the highest priority based on building these distance capabilities. >> commissioner lee?

>> thank you. there is the both of you for being here, for your testimony, very interesting. this is for both of you. it's a bit of a broader question. both in your testimonies, you talk about the various motivations that the chinese government has rebuilding of these expeditionary forces and power projection. some of them are completely legitimate and understandable. things like protecting the safety of chinese citizens abroad, chinese investments abroad, participating internationally disaster. some of them are more problematic. he talked about the narrative that beijing uses the justify certain operations. do either of you have some insides or guidance to happening this tangle the public narrative, the totally defensible reasons for the kind

of buildup's and actions we have been talking about here. versus what might be the true motivations. it seems to me that there are implication certainly for u.s. policy. where the concern should be. the united states is unnecessarily going to be concerned about stopping china from protecting its citizens abroad. but other kind a military capabilities, sort of intimidation, or bully, or coercion that could be happening. that could be a more concern. that's a broad question for both of you. >> thank you for that question. more than the narrative, i actually look at the actions. things like the security cooperation agreements in central asia. which so far of allowed a small peoples armed police, potentially the pla, but hasn't been confirmed, presence into

just stand. where there's going to build some small facilities. things like that where it allows for increased influence for china in those countries. it allows for a pla presents that is stationed there. it could be potentially expanded. those are the areas that we would be concerned about. those are areas that, it's actually becoming more and more apparent, which country china is wooing. it gives the u.s. an opportunity to go in there and offer incentives. potentially to countries that are thinking of cooperating military, or with pla presence, in their area. it's those types of actions that i would be concerned about, rather than what they say they are doing. but you pointed out, it is very justifiable in many ways. there is a broader game at play.

>> admiral blair? >> i think she has it right. the international relations are really a dense range of capabilities. there are not many red lines where you can say you are in favor of this and opposed to this. in the real world it gets difficult. for years we have leaned in favor of giving china the benefit of the doubt in these things, things that otherwise would look aggressive against international norms would be justified by speeches by the chinese. we say they will learn as they get older that this is -- we -- this is not how much her countries act. we need to start calling those out on the basis of the reality. every so often you can find a smoking gun, an aggressive

military move and that out to be -- that ought to be called out. other things are pretty unexceptionable. the way china has conducted noncombatant evacuations in yemen, it does respond to popular opinion that these are chinese and they ought to be protected by the government. they are protected in a responsible manner without taking advantage of it to leave behind a force which would be useful in the future. i would say those would be okay. i would say we put the weight of our judgment on being more suspicious and active in calling them out. in my experience with the chinese that is better for dealing with them. will go to the end of the wishy -- if the united states is wishy-washy about something they will go to the end of the wishy and forget about the washy. we need to be clear about what

we will countenance and what we will oppose. >> thank you. >> senator? >> admiral blair, one for you. as i read your testimony, i think you discounted a little bit what the chinese might be doing in africa and latin america. i think i agree with that if we are just talking about expeditionary projection in the typical sense. tell me whether you are concerned about the following kind of possible gray zone military scenario. investments in a west african

country followed by inducements to the local leadership and corrupting them coupled with increasing diplomatic immigration over time. perhaps training of military forces leading up to a base on the west coast of africa from which they can monitor our ships in the atlantic and etc.. i can easily see them moving in that direction and that may be a greater danger than i think you are estimating in terms of your testimony. if you could comment on that. the other one, you say in your testimony while the pla is unlikely to deploy abroad to protect these investments. and i wondered if you would expand on why it is unlikely they would do that. everyone else who is testifying says that is a primary driver of what they are doing.

have at it. admrl. blair: on africa and latin america i am cynical having been involved in competitions with the soviet union in this area. the reason they accept huge amounts of economic aid director assistance to have a change of mind and say sorry, don't let the door hit you on the way out. it is infinite in my experience. the political structure, particularly of the authoritarian regimes can change quite quickly and you either get another authoritarian or you get something better. either one of those is probably better for american interests. i don't get so worried about an

unbroken chain of influence faces, hard allies lasting decades. that doesn't mean that we don't contest that in those countries, that does not mean that we do not offer them alternatives or stop calling out their authoritarian regimes and deal more directly with the people who will get rid of these thugs anyhow. we have to be in that game, we have to be working hard on it. i don't think we need to be overall driven by a fear that there will be a base there and have that historic -- have our thinking to the point that we are worried about it. >> they are absolutely going to deploy abroad to protect their investments. that line from my testimony was related to facilities, factories, railways, etc. like infrastructure. the reason they may not deploy to protect those infrastructure

projects is they are increasingly using private security companies and a combination of those companies and local forces to protect those investments. for the rest of them, the maritime stuff, the larger pri projects, and energy investments -- bri projects, and energy investments they are deploying it to protect those. >> in the first instance the host country forces private security etc.. they had the invitation from the host country, don't you think they would? >> it depends on how the private security company relationship evolved and what the threat is. as an example, in south sudan they are deploying their peacekeeping troops through the u.n. but they are actually deploying pla there as well as in some

cases using local security forces to protect the oil fields. if you are talking about a factory in uganda, there was a wave of unrest in 2018 in uganda that threatened chinese citizens, they asked the ugandan military to come out and protect those. it depends on the relationship that china has with the country and the threat that exists. >> commissioner goodwin. senator goodwin. >> thank you commissioner. but you bring testimony this morning. i had a quick follow-up to the chairwoman cleveland's comment to you. this is about domestic expectations in china. in response to her question, and in your testimony. you alluded to the fact that the chinese public increasingly expects their government to be able to protect its citizens abroad. as a result, to be able to

develop and deploy these expeditionary capabilities. it's certainly an understandable expectation, and understandable pressures. my question is whether there are broader domestic pressures as well. perhaps especially in this polling that you reference. is there any indication of broad based support among the chinese domestic public. for these other motivations behind the development of expeditionary capabilities. the chinese dream. elevation of china's role in the world. the resulting increased involvement in international relations, international security, and playing a larger role in the global? >> >> there absolutely is that connection. beyond the protection of chinese citizens of fraud--xi jinping with his chinese dream has linked a strong military to a prosperous society and china as a great power so the public supports this. part of seeing a great power is

having basis abroad, a carrier you can send out, being able to do a noncombatant a noncombatant vacuum and operation if you need to and being able to be self-sufficient enough as a military power to be on the global stage like that. there is that, beyond protection of interests there is the expectation from the chinese public area you can see some of this in those foreign policy studies i mentioned earlier. -- from the chinese public. you can see some of this in those foreign policy studies i mentioned earlier. you can see it in the analysis in china -- i do not want to say they are abandoning noninterference, but this idea that the noninterference principle has been broadened. the opening of the base in djibouti and the enabling of the counterterrorism law that

allows pla troops to deploy overseas without asking host countries for permission, this is not something that would be expected before. these are all to me indicators that the chinese